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THE ERISA PREEMPTION QUESTION: WHY
SOME HMO MEMBERS ARE DYING FOR
CONGRESS TO AMEND ERISA
I. INTRODUCTION
Linda Visconti's infant daughter, Serena Mary Visconti, was a fully
developed baby girl with no signs of congenital abnormalities and
weighed five pounds, nine ounces. Despite these statistics, Serena was
stillborn.2  During Mrs. Visconti's third trimester of pregnancy with
Serena, she developed symptoms typical of preeclampsia' Mrs. Vis-
conti's obstetrician ignored these symptoms, and his negligence alleg-
edly caused Serena's death.4 The Viscontis brought suit against their
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"), U.S. Healthcare, for mal-
practice.6 The United States Court of Appeals held that the Viscontis'
malpractice claim against their HMO could go forward in state court
where the Viscontis could pursue a remedy.
7
Florence Corcoran was also pregnant and her obstetrician estab-
lished that it was a high risk pregnancy.8 He "recommended that she
have complete bed rest during [her] final months of pregnancy," and
admitted her to the hospital.9 Her HMO, United Health Care, deter-
mined that hospitalization was not necessary and instead authorized
home nursing care for ten hours per day.0 During a time when no nurse
1. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 857 F.3d 1097, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd 57 F.3d
350 (3d Cir. 1995).
2. See id.
3. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,353 (3d Cir. 1995).
4. See id.
5. For the purposes of this Comment, "Health Maintenance Organization" is used as a
generic term for all managed health care plans. As such, it refers to "any entity which deliv-
ers, administers, or assumes risk for health care services with systems or techniques to control
or influence the quality, accessibility, utilization, or costs and prices of such services to a de-
fined enrollee population." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(8) (West Supp.
1999). This definition is borrowed from the Texas Statutes, and includes, but is not limited to,
Health Maintenance Organizations, Preferred Provider Organizations, and Utilization Re-
view Organizations.
6. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
7. See id. at 361.
8. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321,1322 (5th Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 1322-23.
10. See id. at 1324.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
was on duty, Mrs. Corcoran's baby went into distress and died in utero."
The Corcoran's brought suit against their HMO for wrongful death.
The United States Court of Appeals held that the Corcoran's wrongful
death claim was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act ("ERISA"),"3 and that the Corcorans had no remedy for the al-
leged wrongful death of their child.'4
The disparate outcomes of these two cases illustrate the inequitable
force of ERISA. This Comment first analyzes the pertinent provisions
of ERISA with respect to bringing an action against an HMO. It then
explores the case law which has fleshed-out these ERISA provisions.
This Comment then presents legislative, judicial, political, and popular
reaction to ERISA's inequitable outcomes. Finally, it proposes how
Congress should revise ERISA to preserve its original intent-to pro-
tect employees.
II. ERISA
A. The Pertinent ERISA Provisions
In the early 1970s, an increasing number of employees were partici-
pating in employee benefit plans." Absent minimum standards, some of
these plans were depriving plan participants of anticipated benefits." In
response to this dilemma, President Ford signed the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act ("ERISA")'7 into law in 1974. ERISA
sought to protect employee benefit plan participants by establishing
minimum standards, "providing appropriate remedies," and providing
"ready access to the federal courts."'8 Additionally, ERISA endeavored
to standardize the regulation of employee benefit plans by "pre-
empt[ing] the field for Federal regulation, thus eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent state and local regulation.' 9 Put another way,
by enacting ERISA, Congress was attempting to protect employees
from unfair benefit plan practices while federally protecting the plans
11. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
12. See id.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
14. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). This is the "Congressional findings and declaration
of policy" provision of ERISA.
16. See id. § 1001 (a).
17. See id. §§ 1001-1461.
18. Id. § 1001(b).
19. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 & 29,933 (1974) (quoting Senator Williams).
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from inappropriate remedies.
The sections of ERISA pertinent to claims against an HMO include
§§ 1002, 1003, 1132, 1133, and 1144. Section 1002 contains the defini-
tions for ERISA. The Act defines an "employee welfare benefit plan"
as "any plan... which was.., established or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization... for the purpose of providing for its
participants ... through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ...
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits ... in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment."' Courts have consistently
held that the typical managed health care plan falls within the ERISA
definition.2'
Section 1003 of ERISA frames the scope of the Act's coverage.'
The scope of ERISA is broad because it applies to any employee benefit
plan that is established or maintained by either an employer or an em-
ployee organization which is engaged in activities of commerce.
ERISA does not apply to several stated exceptions, namely: governmen-
tal plans; church plans; plans "maintained solely for the purpose of
complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws;" plans "main-
tained outside the United States;" and unfunded "excess benefit
plans.
24
Section 1132 of ERISA, which was previously section 502 of the Act,
is the civil enforcement provision. It delineates who may bring claims,
and what claims may be brought, under ERISA.2 This section's perti-
nent language is as follows:
§ 1132. Civil enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
21. See Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, Inc., 1997 WL 452750, at *1 (N.D. Tex.)
(July 31,1997); Schwartz v. FHP Int'l Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1996); Roessert
v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343,346 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994).
23. See id. § 1003 (a)(1)-(3).
24. Id. 88 1003 (b)(1)-(5).
25. See id. § 1132.
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the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other ap-
propriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan.
2 6
The Act restricts who can bring a civil action against an employee
benefit plan to the Secretary of Labor, the state, and the plan participant
(which includes the participant's beneficiary or fiduciary).' For the plan
participant, the claims available under ERISA include (1) a claim to
"recover benefits due ... under the terms of his plan," (2) a claim "to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan," (3) a claim "to clarify his
rights to future benefits under [his] plan," (4) a claim for the breach of a
fiduciary duty under his plan, or (5) a claim for the failure to provide re-
quested information about his plan.8 The relief available under ERISA
includes an injunction of the violative action, equitable relief in the form
of redress for the violation, or the enforcement of the provision that the
plan failed to discharge. 9
Section 1133 of ERISA outlines the claim procedure that the em-
ployee benefit plan must follow when denying a benefit to a plan par-
ticipant.' The Act requires the plan to give the participant a reasonable
opportunity for full and fair review of the decision to deny the claim."
Section 1144, which was previously section 514 of the Act, is the fed-
eral preemption provision of ERISA. The pertinent provision states:
§ 1144. Other laws
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided.., the provisions of this subchapter... shall
supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3).
27. See id. §§ 1132(a)(1)-(9).
28. Id. §§ 1132 (a)(1)(A)-(B), (c), 1109, 1025.
29. See id. § 1132(a)(3).
30. See id. § 1133.
31. See id. § 1133(2).
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title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.32
The "relate to" phrase of this provision has become the central point
of contention in claims brought against HMOs.
B. Why Avoid ERISA Preemption?
ERISA preemption means that an HMO can remove a state claim to
the federal court as a federal question. Most plan participants harmed
by an ERISA plan will seek to avoid ERISA preemption because of the
limited remedies available under the Act.
Section 1132 of ERISA limits the relief available to plan participants
to either enjoining the HMO from continuing a violative practice or ob-
taiming an equitable remedy.33 The equitable remedies available under
the Act include redress for the ERISA violation or enforcement of the
unfulfilled provision. 3' In a split of opinion, five circuits of the United
States Court of Appeals have adopted the doctrine that "equitable re-
lief" is limited to declaratory and injunctive relief.35 Under this view, §
1132 precludes punitive damages as well as "make whole" damages for
injuries resulting from not getting treatment or from receiving improper
treatment. For example, if an HMO refuses to pay for a needed test, the
damages will likely be limited to the cost of the test.36 Put another way,
if a woman dies because a mammogram was refused and her breast can-
cer was not detected, the damages are limited to $99-or whatever the
cost of the mammogram? The fact that a plaintiff will have no remedy
does not affect whether ERISA will supersede state law.8
The question of whether punitive or extracontractua 39 damages are
32. Id. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
33. See id. § 1132(a)(3).
34. See id.
35. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1336 n.18 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1988), Harsch v. Eis-
enberg, 956 F.2d 651, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1992); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759-61
(8th Cir. 1992); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1988); Sokol v. Bern-
stein, 803 F.2d 532,534-37 (9th Cir. 1986).
36. See Michael Higgins, Increased Exposure for HMOs: Texas Law Allows Patients to
Sue; Health Plans Will Wage Preemption Battle, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 24.
37. See id.
3& Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333-34 (citing Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins.
Co., 904 F.2d 236,248, n.16 (5th Cir. 1990)).
39. "Extracontractual" damages refers to "damages that would give an [HMO] benefici-
ary more than he or she is entitled to receive under the strict terms of the plan." Corcoran,
965 F.2d at 1335.
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available under § 1132 of ERISA has not been answered conclusively by
the Supreme Court of the United States.'° In Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Russell,' the Supreme Court determined that
these types of damages were not available under a separate section of
ERISA," but did not consider whether such damages were available un-
der § 1132, as the plaintiff did not implicate that section in his com-
plaint.' In the concurring opinion of this case, however, Justice Bren-
nan addressed this option." Justice Brennan first observed that
Congress integrated trust law principles into the enforcement scheme of
ERISA.4 Under trust law principles, beneficiaries are "entitled to a
remedy 'which will put him in the position in which he would have been
if the trustee had not committed the breach of trust;"' namely "make-
whole" relief.4' Justice Brennan encouraged courts to first determine to
what extent state and federal trust and pension law provides for the re-
covery of damages beyond any benefits that have been withheld and
second, to consider whether extracontractual relief would conflict with
ERISA in any way.47 Further, Justice Brennan encouraged courts to
authorize make-whole remedies under § 1132 where they were not
available under trust law.' But, even after this plea from Justice Bren-
nan, courts are hesitant to award make-whole remedies in an ERISA
context.49
As suggested by Justice Brennan's concurrence in Russell,;0 contract
priciples may govern the damage provision of § 1132." Contract prin-
ciples, if utilized as some courts have suggested, 2 would "enable[ ] an
aggrieved party to recover such damages as would place him in the posi-
tion he would have occupied had the contract been performed... in-
40. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1335.
41. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
42. The Supreme Court determined that punitive and extracontractual damages were
not available under section 409(a) of ERISA. See id. at 148.
43. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1335.
44. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 155-58 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 156-57.
46. Id. at 157 n.16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205, and cmt. a
(1959)).
47. See id. at 157-58.
48. See id.
49. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (5th Cir. 1992).
50. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
51. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1336 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989)).
52. See id.
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cluding those damages that could reasonably have been foreseen to flow
from the breach."53 A breach of contract claim is limited, however, and
is not available for a contract between a patient and a physician unless
they expressly agree to a particular service or a specific cure.' Accord-
ingly, contract principles would be available in a § 1132 analysis in only
very limited instances.
Another limitation of ERISA's remedy provisions is that if a plan
participant actually dies from the HMO's lack of care, her survivors
cannot "enforce [her] rights under the terms of the plan."55 At least one
court has held that a deceased plan participant's rights under an HMO
plan are no longer viable after death.56 Accordingly, death precludes the
"enforcement" remedy of ERISA.
C. How To Avoid ERISA Preemption
Because the remedies available under ERISA are so uncertain and
sometimes non-existent, plaintiffs will generally attempt to avoid
ERISA preemption in favor of state law remedies. The following analy-
sis highlights how the preemption provision can be avoided.
1. The Well Pleaded Complaint Rule and Complete Preemption
The first barrier to overcome in successfully avoiding ERISA pre-
emption is meeting the "well pleaded complaint rule" criteria. The
"well pleaded complaint rule," as stated by the Supreme Court, provides
that a civil action arises under federal law when a federal question ap-
pears on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaintY Addi-
tionally, a defendant cannot convert a plaintiff's state claim into a fed-
eral question solely on the basis of an asserted federal defense "even if
the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both
parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue."' Con-
sequently, federal preemption, as a defense, "does not appear on the
face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not authorize re-
53. Id. at 1336-37 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS §§ 347, 347 cmt. a,
351 (1981)).
54. See id. at 1337.
55. Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419,425 (D. Mass. 1997)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (B) (1994)).
56. See id. (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993)).
57. See Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1983) (citing Taylor v. Anderson 234 U.S. 74,75-76 (1914)).
5& Id. at 14.
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moval to federal court. 59
An exception exists, however, to the "well pleaded complaint rule"
which is "complete preemption." "Complete preemption" exists when
Congress "so completely pre-empt[s] a particular area that any civil
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in
character. ' If complete preemption is implicated, a defendant is able
to convert a plaintiff's state claim into a federal question merely by im-
plicating the defense.
2. The Preemption Clause of ERISA and Complete Preemption
The preemption clause of ERISA states that the Act "shall super-
sede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan."6' The Supreme Court has stated that this
clause "is conspicuous for its breadth." 2 Accordingly, it has directed the
federal courts to apply ERISA's preemption clause expansively.63 Al-
though the phrase "relate to" has been recognized as broad, it is not
necessarily unlimited.64 The Supreme Court has commented that "[i]f
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indetermi-
nacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its
course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere."'65 The Court
opined that to extend "relate to" to the furthest stretch of indeterminacy
"would be to read Congress's words of limitation as mere sham, and to
read the presumption against pre-emption out of the law whenever
Congress speaks to [a] matter with generality."66
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Company, the Court reiterated its previous holding
that "'[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan... if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan."'67 For example, if a claim "rests
upon the terms of [a] plan or requires construction of the plan lan-
59. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat.
Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)).
60. Id. at 63.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
62. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,58 (1990).
63. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (citing Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,46 (1987).
64. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
65. Id. (quotation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 656 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (emphasis
added)).
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guage," it will be preempted by ERISA under the "relate to" analysis of
§ 1144.6 Additionally, the Court stated that "'[p]re-emption does not
occur... if the state law has only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral con-
nection with [an ERISA] plan... . 6 9 The Court concluded that "noth-
ing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that
Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which histori-
cally has been a matter of local concern.""0 The Court draws the distinc-
tion that a state law "relates to" a benefit plan if it "'bear[s] indirectly
but substantially on all insured benefit plans,"' but the state law does
not "relate to" a benefit plan if it "'regulate[s] only the insurer, or the
way in which it may sell insurance.' 7. Stated another way, if a state law
does not jeopardize the nationally uniform administration of employee
benefit plans, ERISA will not preempt the local legislation. In this con-
text, state laws include both state statutesn as well as common law
causes of action. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "law-
suits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law claims ... [in-
cluding] torts committed by an ERISA plan.., are not pre-empted by
ERISA."74
If a § 1144 "relation" is found, the federal court is without removal
jurisdiction and the state court must resolve the ERISA preemption
dispute 5 This is termed "ERISA preemption." 76
68. Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Or. 1997) (citing
Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637,644-45 (7th Cir. 1995)).
69. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 661
(quoting District of Columbia v. The Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1
(1992)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 663 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739-41
(1985)).
72. Statutes may also be preempted by ERISA. For example, the Supreme Court found
that a statute which was interpreted by state courts as prohibiting an employee benefit plan
from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy was preempted. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). The Supreme Court similarly held that ERISA preempted a statute
which explicitly barred the garnishment of ERISA plan funds. See Mackey v. Lanier Collec-
tion Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). Likewise, the Court held that ERISA pre-
empted a statute which prohibited an employee benefit plan from offsetting benefits by the
amount of worker's compensation payments. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504 (1981). Further, the Court held that ERISA preempted a statute which abolished an
employee benefit plan's right to subrogation from a tort recovery. See FMC Corp. v. Holli-
day, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
73. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,48 (1987).
74. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825,833 (1988).
75. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,355 (3rd Cir. 1995) (citing Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4, 27-28 (1983)).
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This is not the case, however, if the claim embodies a "complete
preemption" question. Complete preemption occurs when § 1132 of
ERISA is involved. Section 1132 has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as an enumeration of claims which are categorically preempted by
ERISA.? Consequently, where a plan participant brings a claim against
an HMO which seeks to recover benefits due, to enforce his rights, or to
clarify his rights, the claim is completely preempted by ERISA and
automatically presents a federal question which must be addressed in
federal court.78
If a party seeks to avoid ERISA preemption, the party must care-
fully word his complaint to avoid the connotation that the claim is
seeking to recover benefits due to the party, or to enforce or clarify the
party's rights under an ERISA plan, if these are not the goals sought by
the claim.
III. How THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE
PREEMPTION CLAUSE OF ERISA
Federal courts have consistently found that the ultimate question of
whether a claim is completely preempted by ERISA rests with a "quan-
tity" versus "quality" analysis. A quantity question arises when a claim
alleges that the plan "withheld some quantum of plan benefits due."79
When a claim alleges that a promised benefit was not provided by the
plan, the claim is to "recover benefits due" under § 1132 of ERISA and
is, thereby, completely preempted."
"Quality," on the other hand, refers to the situation where the plan
beneficiary receives the benefit promised by the HMO, but the benefit
received is substandard."1 When a claim alleges that a substandard bene-
fit was received, § 1132 of ERISA is not implicated and complete pre-
emption does not occur.' A second analysis is then performed to de-
termine whether the claim "relates to" the ERISA plan at all.83
76. See Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Or. 1997).
77. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
78. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
79. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 355-57.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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A. Within the Scope of Preemption: Claims Based Upon the "Quantity"
of Medical Care Received
This section presents various examples of claims brought against
HMOs that were determined to be "quantity" challenges. The most
straightforward claim involving a "quantity" challenge is the denial of
benefits. For example, in Sofo v. Pan American Life Insurance Com-
pany the plaintiff sought to be reimbursed by his HMO for medical
treatment that he received and paid for out of his own pocket." The
court held that Sofo's claim was based upon the quantity of benefits due
and was thereby preempted by ERISA." Another case where a claim
was preempted on quantity grounds is Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan." Here, the court found that a claim for negligently estab-
lishing an incentive plan, whereby physicians received bonuses for
avoiding excessive treatments and tests, was a quantity challenge gov-
erned by ERISA.8 Another example is the case of Schmid v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan where the court held that a claim for breach of
contract for (1) failing to perform certain diagnostic tests, (2) providing
some kinds of treatment rather than others, (3) failing to authorize visits
to a different physician, and (4) failing to heed the opinion of an outside
specialist was based upon the quantity of medical care provided."
Fraud and misrepresentation claims based upon the terms of an
ERISA agreement have also been held to be quantity challenges which
are preempted by ERISA. In Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corporation, the
court preempted a claim which alleged that the employment benefit
plan contained fraudulent terms.89 Similarly, a claim against a plan
spokesman for misrepresenting available benefits under an employee
benefit plan was preempted in Berger v. Edgewater Steel Company.'
84. Sofo v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239,240-41 (7th Cir. 1994).
85. See id. at 241.
86. 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
87. See id. at 1147-50.
88. Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 943, 945 (D. Or. 1997). Sev-
eral other breach of contract claims have also been held to be preempted by ERISA. See,
e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc. 959 F.2d
6, 8-10 (2d Cir. 1992); Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419, 424
(D. Mass. 1997); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
89. Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1218 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Diduck
v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,287-88 (2d Cir. 1992).
90. 911 F.2d 911,923 (3rd Cir. 1990); see also Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1218.
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B. Beyond the Scope of Preemption: Claims Based Upon the "Quality"
of Medical Care Received
The general rule is that a claim brought against an HMO which is
based upon the quality of medical care received by the plaintiff is not
preempted by ERISA. The main "quality" challenge against HMOs,
which has been recognized by the weight of authority, is an HMO's vi-
carious liability for the medical malpractice of its agents."
In Schwartz v. FHP International Corporation, the plaintiff, Diane
Schwartz, told her doctor "that she had a family history of cancer and
that she believed she had found a lump in her left breast." 9 Her doctor
told her it was nothing.93 A year later, Mrs. Schwartz believed that the
lump had increased in size so she scheduled a mammogram.Y The radi-
ologist read the manmrrogram as normal.' Finally, two years after Mrs.
Schwartz herself found the lump in her breast, an oncologist diagnosed
her with breast cancer.96 The Schwartzs brought suit against their HMO
under several theories, including vicarious liability for the medical mal-
practice of the plan's physicians. 7 The court identified that there was a
split in authority among the federal courts regarding whether vicarious
liability claims were preempted by ERISA, and thus remanded the issue
to the state court to resolve.98
The court in Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Os-
teopathic Medicine recognized the viability of vicarious liability claims
against HMOs. 9 In Elsesser, Carolyn Verzicco complained to her doc-
91. Managed Health Care Organizations have been found vicariously liable for the acts
of their agents in a number of courts. See Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d
151,154-55 (10th Cir. 1995); Dykema v. King, 959 F. Supp 736,740-41 (D.S.C. 1997); Yanez v.
Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F.
Supp. 113, 117-18 (D. Md. 1996). Courts have also accepted a theory of respondeat superior
against HMOs for the acts of their employees. See Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F. Supp 733, 735-
36 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Rice v. Pancha, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
However, there are some courts that refuse to hold an HMO vicariously liable for the
acts of their agents. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (D.NJ. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F.
Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 63-65
(D. Conn. 1990)).
92. Schwartz v. FHP Int'l Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ariz. 1996).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1360.
99. 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992). It should be noted that two of the cases which
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tor of "chest pain, mild shortness of breath, and numbness in her shoul-
ders."' ° After an abnormal electrocardiogram test result, the doctor or-
dered a Halter Monitor for Ms. Verzicco."" After using the monitor for
only one day, Ms. Verzicco's doctor discontinued its use and declined to
read its results because her HMO refused to pay for the device.' °2 Ap-
proximately two weeks later, Ms. Verzicco again experienced chest pain
and went to the emergency room.°3 The emergency room doctors gave
her medication and told her to return to her regular doctor." The next
day, while Ms. Verzicco was driving, she "experienced extreme chest
pain and passed out."' 5 She was taken to the emergency room and re-
suscitated, but did not regain consciousnessY At the time that the case
was heard, Ms. Verzicco remained in a "persistent vegetative state. ' °
Ms. Verzicco's guardians brought several claims against her HMO, in-
cluding a claim for the HMO's vicarious liability for their member doc-
tors."
The court stated that "[a]lthough an HMO is not usually liable for
the negligence of the independent contractor physicians and health care
providers that service the HMO members, an HMO may nevertheless
be held liable if the health care provider is the 'ostensible agent' of the
HMO."''9 The court then went on to present the two factors required
for a finding of ostensible agency: "(1) whether the patient looks to the
institution, rather than the individual physician for care, and (2) whether
the HMO 'holds out' the physician as its employee."' 0 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs met these requirements and that their claim for
vicarious liability against the HMO could move forward."'
either disagreed with the Elsesser decision, or declined to follow the decision, have since re-
considered the vicarious liability issue in subsequent decisions. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (reconsidering two cases on appeal: Dukes v. U.S. Health Care
Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), and Visconti v. U.S. Health
Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
100. Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1288.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1289.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1287-88.
109. Id. at 1290 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 1290 n.3 (quoting Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1233 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988)).
111. Id. at 1290.
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The court further reasoned that the plaintiff's vicarious liability
claim did not rely upon the actual employee benefit plan, but rather on
the "principles of professional malpractice. 12 It then relied upon a fed-
eral court of appeals holding that "'ERISA does not generally pre-empt
state professional malpractice actions.' '' . Consequently, the effect that
a state malpractice law has on an HMO's plan can be found to be too
"'tenuous, remote, or peripheral' to implicate ERISA.'14 Additionally,
referring to a plan to merely establish the relationships between the par-
ties was not sufficient to invoke ERISA preemption."5
On the other hand, in the federal courts where vicarious liability is
found to be preempted by ERISA, the courts have reasoned that the
relationship between the HMO and the member physicians sufficiently
"relate[s] to" the terms of the ERISA plan to merit preemption.11 6
In short, a claim which seeks to hold an HMO vicariously liable for
the substandard quality of its ostensible agents will not be preempted by
ERISA in federal courts that view such a claim as "too tenuous, remote
or peripheral" to "relate to" an ERISA plan.
C. What Happens if "Quantity" Affects "Quality:" Utilization Review
"Utilization review" is a cost containment process by which an HMO
performs an external evaluation of a medical decision to evaluate its ap-
propriateness.1 7 One example- of a "utilization review" procedure is il-
lustrated in Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc."' In Corcoran, United
HealthCare performed utilization review, including "pre-certification"
whereby participants were required to "get advance approval for over-
night hospital admissions and certain medical procedures," as well as
"concurrent review" whereby participants were required to "get ap-
proval on a continuing basis" after they were admitted to the hospital."9
112. Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1290.
113. Id. (quoting Painters of Philadelphia Dist. Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price
Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)).
114. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992)
(citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
115. See Kearney v. U.S.'Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
116. See Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 61, 63-64 (D. Conn. 1990).
117. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and
Case Management, 26 HOus. L. REV. 191,192-93 (1989)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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These procedures are marketed to plan participants under the guise that
the process "'[p]rovides improved quality of care by eliminating medi-
cally unnecessary treatment.")1 2
Utilization review implicates two competing concepts under the
ERISA preemption analysis: (1) the review is used to determine the
plan participant's benefits available under the plan which is a "quantity"
question, and (2) the review is used to make a medical decision which is
a "quality" question.2 In balancing these two competing concepts, the
Corcoran court held that the medical decisions made under the utiliza-
tion review procedure were "part and parcel" of its benefits determina-
tion.'2 Accordingly, the court concluded that claims based upon negli-
gent utilization review procedures were preempted by ERISA.'1 Other
courts have held likewise.
For example, in Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Charlotte
Turner was diagnosed with breast cancer and her oncologist determined
that she required a bone marrow transplant.24 The oncologist recom-
mended that Mrs. Turfier enroll in the Dana Farber Cancer Institute's
transplant program, but she did not meet their eligibility requirements."
Dana Farber recommended that Mrs. Turner enroll in Duke Univer-
sity's transplant program, but Mrs. Turner's HMO only covered bone
marrow transplants for certain diseases, not including the type of solid
cancer tumors that Mrs. Turner had.'6 In response to Mrs. Turner's re-
quest to amend their utilization review process to add breast cancer to
its covered procedures, the HMO reviewed its protocols and extended
its coverage to solid cancer tumors, but only when the patient met Dana
Farber requirements.27 The HMO's decision effectively precluded Mrs.
Turner from receiving the needed treatment.'2 After Mrs. Turner's un-
successful final appeal to her HMO for coverage of the Duke program,
she began chemotherapy but died ten months later.1 29 The Turner court
held that the majority rule with respect to claims against utilization re-
120. Id. at 1324 (quoting United HealthCare's utilization review information booklet).
121. See id. at 1332.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419, 420 (D. Mass.
1997).
125. See id. at 420-21.
126. See id. at 421.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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view procedures is that they are preempted by ERISA, and thus con-
cluded that the Turner's claim was preempted.'O
In Roessert v. Health Net, the court summed up the rule by stating
that claims are preempted by ERISA if the negligent medical advice is
"inextricable" from the actions of coordinating benefits under an em-
ployee benefit plan. 3' Utilization review procedures are viewed as "in-
extricable" from the coordination of benefits, and thus are preempted
by ERISA, in all but one state. California explicitly permits a claim for
a negligent medical decision made in the course of the utilization review
process.'32
The practical effect of insulating utilization review from claims by
injured parties is that it gives HMOs incentives to deny medical proce-
dures in order to save the expense of the procedures, and at the same
time it removes any deterrence the HMO may have from potential
claims for negligently denying a procedure.'33
IV. LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, POLITICAL, AND POPULAR REACTION
TO THE INEQUITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF ERISA PREEMPTION
The HMO horror stories, and concomitant lack of liability for the re-
sulting wrongdoing, has made ERISA preemption a hot topic in the
courts, in the legislatures, and on the campaign trail. As one pundit ob-
served, "'[t]his issue has become a no-brainer politically' ... 'you have
an industry that can't be sued when you can sue your neighbor for run-
ning over your lawn.", 134 The issue has prompted action in Texas, Con-
gress, and in the 1998 fall elections.
A. The Beginning of the End? One State's Attempt to Push the
Preemption Envelope
In September 1997, the Texas legislature enacted Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Chapter 88 ("Chapter 88").' Chapter 88 allows
130. See Turner, 953 F. Supp. at 423-24.
131. Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343,350 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
132. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), cert. granted, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986), review dismissed,
cause remanded, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987)).
133. See id. at 1338.
134. Leigh Page, Managed Care Emerges as Major Election Year Issue, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 19, 1998 (quoting Robert Blendon, Professor of Health Policy and Political
Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health).
135. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 1998).
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HMO enrollees to sue their HMO for failing to use "ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions"-allowing HMOs to be sued
for malpractice.136 Under the statute, the HMO may be found liable for
damages for harm to enrollees "proximately caused" by the health care
treatment decisions of its employees, agents, ostensible agents, or repre-
sentatives.'- Additionally, Chapter 88 restrains an HMO from removing
a health care provider from its plan, or refusing to renew their contract
with the provider, on the grounds that the "health care provider advo-
cat[ed] on behalf of [the patient] for appropriate and medically neces-
sary health care.' 3' This provision reflects the concern of lawmakers
over a common practice of HMOs whereby the plan threatens health
care providers with termination from the plan if they are deemed to be
giving patients excessive or more expensive medical care than the plan
authorizes.'39 A threat of contract termination provides a strong incen-
tive to physicians whose practices commonly depend upon HMO con-
tracts to survive. 4'
Chapter 88 also bans all "indemnification" and "hold harmless"
clauses in contracts between HMOs and physicians.14' This provision
protects physicians from another common HMO practice which leaves a
physician "holding the bag" for substandard medical care. 42 For exam--
ple, an HMO may order a physician to abstain from doing a certain pro-
cedure through utilization review procedures which ultimately turns out
to be medically necessary. Thereupon, the "hold harmless" provision in
the HMO contract leaves the doctor solely liable for the consequences
of the decision. Additionally, Chapter 88 precludes HMOs from using
the defense that they are "not licensed to practice medicine" in order to
avoid liability when faced with a medical malpractice action. 43
Chapter 88 also delineates the procedure to be used by HMO par-
ticipants when seeking the remedies available under the statute. The
statute requires a party to either exhaust the appeals available under the
plan or give written notice of his or her claim, together with an agree-
136. Id. § 88.002(a).
137. Id. § 88.002(b).
138. Id. § 88.002(f).
139. See generally John P. Little, D.M.D., Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion:
Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1397, 1416-18 (1997).
140. See id. at 1440.
141. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(g).
142. See Little, supra note 139, at 1416-18.
143. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(h).
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ment to submit the claim to independent review, to the HMO before in-
stituting legal action against an HMO.' 4' If the complained of injury has
already occurred, a court may waive the independent review require-
ment of the statute.145 Finally, if following the procedures outlined in the
statute would place the plan participant's health in "serious jeopardy,"
the statute allows him to bypass the notice and review requirements and
pursue other remedies including injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or
any other available legal relief."4
One commentator outlines how the typical case would move through
Chapter 88 procedures as follows:
1. The HMO refuses to pay for a medical procedure, finding, for
example, that the treatment is not medically necessary.
2. The HMO member appeals within the health organization.
3. If the member loses, he or she appeals to an Independent Re-
view Organization ["IRO"], a private company chosen by the
state Department of Insurance.
4. If the IRO finds that the treatment is medically necessary, the
HMO must pay. If the member loses, he or she may sue in state
court.
5. To prevail in court, the member must show that the HMO
failed to use ordinary care when deciding to deny treatment.
6. If the HMO's failure to pay harmed the member, he or she can
sue for compensatory and punitive damages. A court can waive
IRO review if the injury has already occurred.4
Texas has, in effect, legislatively enacted the federal court decisions
that have held that HMOs could be held liable for the acts of their os-
tensible agents,' and for utilization review decisions.'49
The new law was promptly challenged by several health plans doing
business in Texas."" In Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas De-
partment of Insurance, the health plans sought a declaration that Chap-
144. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003(a)(1), (2).
145. See id. § 88.003(e)(1).
146. Id. § 88.003(g).
147. Higgins, supra note 36, at 24.
148. See supra Part III.B.
149. See supra Part III.C.
150. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., Aetna Health Plans of Texas, Inc., Aetna Health Plans
of North Texas, Inc., and Aetna Life Insurance Company challenged Chapter 88 in Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance, 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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ter 88 was preempted by ERISA and an injunction enjoining the en-
forcement of Chapter 88."' Accordingly, the main task of the court was
to determine whether Chapter 88 was preempted by ERISA.
The Corporate court first determined that Chapter 88 could not be
saved from preemption via the "insurance saving clause" of ERISA. 52
The "insurance saving clause" provides that "nothing in [ERISA] shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance .... ,,... The "insurance saving clause" test
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company v. Massachusetts." Under the test, the first inquiry is whether
the offending regulation fits within the "'common sense definition of in-
surance regulation. ' .'..5 If the answer is "yes," the court moves on to the
second part of the test.'56 The second inquiry under the test is "'(1)
[w]hether the practice [regulated] has the effect of spreading policy-
holder's risk; (2) whether the practice [regulated] is an integral part of
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3)
whether the practice [regulated] is limited to entities within the insur-
ance industry.""'  If the court answers "yes" to all three factors, the
statute is saved from preemption by the "insurance savings clause" of
ERISA.' s Because Chapter 88 was not "limited to entities within the
insurance industry," as it explicitly specified that it also applied to
"health maintenance organizations" and "other managed care entities,"
the Corporate court found that it could not be saved from ERISA pre-
emption under this particular test. 59
The Corporate court then turned to the specific preemption provi-
sion of ERISA: § 1144(a).6 The court's first question under this analy-
sis was whether, in fact, Chapter 88 regulated ERISA plans.16' The court
concluded that Chapter 88 did not regulate ERISA plans because the
Texas legislators defined a "managed care entity" as one that "'[did] not
151. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597,602 (1998).
152. Id. at 607.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(a) (1994).
154. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
155. Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,741-47 (1985)).
156. See id.
157. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741-47
(1985)).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See id; supra Part II.C.2.
161. See id. at 607-08; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing § 1144(a)).
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include an employer purchasing coverage or acting on behalf of its em-
ployees or the employees of one or more subsidiaries or affiliated cor-
porations of the employer.",112 Because the principal definitive feature
of an ERISA plan is that it is "established or maintained by an em-
ployer," the court found that the careful crafting of Chapter 88 enabled
it to avoid being found to regulate ERISA plans.'
Notably, the plaintiffs in Corporate were not ERISA plans. " How-
ever, ERISA challenges by HMOs are not necessarily made on the
HMO's own behalf. Instead, the non-ERISA HMO hopes that because
the regulation may affect an ERISA plan, it can quash the challenge via
ERISA preemption and thereby benefit from the resulting diminish-
ment of regulation on the whole in the industry.165
Having concluded that Chapter 88 did not directly regulate ERISA
plans, the Corporate court next considered whether the statute was "re-
lated to" ERISA plans)" As the Supreme Court reiterated recently in
DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund,67 the "relate
to" language in ERISA "was not intended to modify the 'starting pre-
sumption that Congress does not intend [ERISA] to supplant state law'
which falls within areas of traditional state regulation.' The Corporate
court adjudged that Chapter 88's regulation of "medical decisions [by]
health insurance carriers, health maintenance organizations, and other
managed care entities" was clearly in an area traditionally regulated by
the states.'69 Accordingly, the court again concluded that Chapter 88
was saved from preemption because it did not improperly "relate to" an
ERISA plan.
The Corporate court then conducted a lengthy analysis of "quantity"
versus "quality" ERISA challenges.170 Applying the analysis to Chapter
88, the court concluded that a suit may be brought under Chapter 88
that solely challenged the "quality" of health care received without im-
162. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 88.001(8)) (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. at 609-10 (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 610.
165. See generally id.
166. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610; see also supra Part II.C.2.
167. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
168. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (internal quotes omitted).
169. Id. at 611.
170. See id. at 614-19; see also Part III (discussing "quality" versus "quantity" chal-
lenges).
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plicating "quantity.'' Accordingly, the court once more concluded that
Chapter 88 escaped ERISA preemption72
ERISA preemption may also occur if a regulation impermissively
mandates the structure or administration of employee benefits.' After
analyzing whether Chapter 88 mandated the structure or administration
of employee benefits, the Corporate court concluded that some of its
provisions in fact did. The court found that Chapter 88's independent
review process and its provisions that prohibited certain contract clauses
between HMOs and health care providers were preempted by ERISA.174
However, because these provisions were severable, the court severed
them from Chapter 88 rather than invalidating the entire chapter.'
In sum, the Corporate court gutted the independent review provision
of Chapter 88 and invalidated the mandatory physician/HMO contract
clauses. However, significant and important provisions of the chapter
remain. In Texas, a party injured by an HMO has statutory authority to
sue the plan for malpractice. As previously discussed, several federal
courts have allowed suits to be brought against HMOs for the negli-
gence of their employees, agents, and representatives.' 76 Several other
circuits, however, maintain that such a cause of action is preempted by
ERISA.'" Nonetheless, the final analysis may be forthcoming as the
Corporate parties have appealed to the Supreme Court for relief. This
feud has not deterred other state legislatures from considering a similar
law for themselves.'78 New York, Florida, Arizona, Connecticut, and
California are considering similar legislation.Y7 9
B. Other Popular and Political Reaction
Suing HMOs for malpractice is a popular idea in the United States.
One poll revealed that 73 percent of Americans favor a law that would
allow patients to sue HMOs for malpractice."o One commentator ar-
171. See Corporate Health Ins., Ina, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
172. See id. at 620.
173. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645,658 (1995).
174. See Corporate Health Ins., Ina, 12. F. Supp 2d at 621-628.
175. See id. at 628.
176. See supra Part III.B (regarding how some federal courts have allowed suits to be
brought against HMOs for the negligence of their employees, agents, or representatives).
177. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
17& See Higgins, supra note 36, at 24.
179. See id.
180. See Andy Miller, Perspective Election '98, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 11, 1998, at
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gues that "[i]n managed care, all of the economic incentives are for de-
nying care. What an HMO liability law does is make an HMO have to
think twice about denying care."''"
The idea of holding HMOs accountable is also politically popular.
The "Patient Protection Act" which passed the House 216 to 210,
amends certain provisions of ERISA and would ensure some patient
rights that have traditionally been preempted by ERISA including:
1. Requiring HMOs to cover emergency room care.
2. Requiring HMOs to allow participants to choose their own
pediatrician, obstetrician, and gynecologist.
3. Prohibiting HMOs from using "gag orders" in their contracts
with doctors that prevent doctors from advising their patients
about more costly treatments.
4. Imposing $500 per day fines (up to $250,000) on HMOs for
improperly denying coverage for health care."
Democrats have also proposed similar legislation, the notable differ-
ence being that their plan would allow patients to sue their HMOs for
malpractice. Many sources predict that there will be some legislative
movement on this issue this year."'
Critics of an HMO liability law contend that allowing malpractice
suits against HMOs will increase litigation and drive up the cost of
health care generally. However, thus far the Texas experience does not
support this contention."
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Probably the most persuasive argument for disallowing HMO liabil-
ity laws is the original intent of ERISA: to avoid a "patchwork scheme
181. Miller, supra note 180, at B7.
182. See Roll Call Report, PEORIA J. STAR, Aug. 2, 1998, at A13 (citing Patient Protec-
tion Act of 1998, H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998)).
183. See Politics & Policy Patients' Rights: Positions Solidify as Issue Heats Up, 6 AM.
POL. NETWORK no. 9, at 5 (Feb. 18, 1999); Chafee Unveils Centrist, Bipartisan Managed Care
Reform Legislation, FEDERAL CLEARING HOUSE GOV'T PRESS RELEASE (Feb. 4, 1999);
Andy Miller, Doctors Angry'at HMOs, Insurers Frustration Over Trimmed Fess, Unpaid
Claims Has Spawned Proposed Legislation, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 31, 1999, at H01;
Poll: Public Backs HMO Reform, Even With Higher Cost, CONGRESS DAILY, Jan. 14,1999.
184. See Julia Kingrey, Bills Would Give Patients Recourse in HMO Dealings: Com-
plaints Spur Lawmakers to Act, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at B3; Charles Ornstein,
Aetna Lawsuit Seeks to Overturn Texas Right to Sue HMOs, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIBUNE Bus.
NEWS: DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23,1998.
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of regulation" among the states.' National HMOs would have a strong
argument against such laws, as their costs would increase as they are
forced to comply with varying standards between states. This is the ex-
act outcome that Congress attempted to avoid in enacting ERISA.'86
For this reason, individual state HMO liability laws such as Texas's
Chapter 88 are probably not the best solution even though it would rec-
tify most of the inequities in ERISA preemption results.
Instead, this Comment proposes that Congress step in and amend
ERISA to preserve the intent of its authors-to protect employees and
their benefits.'" Congress is able, on a national level, to institute provi-
sions to protect HMO participants from injuries sustained from the im-
mune acts of these plans.
As stated by one court, "the landscape of employee benefit plans has
shifted dramatically in the . . . 23 years" since Congress enacted
ERISA.' For one thing, Congress probably did not foresee that HMOs
would run the whole show, including the doctors and the hospitals,
which allows them to insulate the whole medical spectrum by invoking
ERISA preemption. Congress probably also did not foresee that HMOs
would implement cost containment practices such as utilization review,
which substitute medical judgment with "nationally accepted medical
guidelines" which likewise insulate an IMO from liability.'89 Congress
probably did not foresee that it was leaving an enormous gap in which
seriously-sometimes fatally-injured parties are left with no remedy
for the culpable behavior of HMOs. Finally, Congress probably did not
foresee that HMOs would not be deterred from making substandard
medical decisions by the fact that injured parties would be unable to
pursue a remedy against the erring HMO.'9
In the best case scenario, Texas's nascent attempt to regulate the in-
equities of ERISA preemption will prompt Congress to continue its ef-
forts to secure patient rights.
As was mentioned in the Introduction to this Comment, the Viscon-
tis successfully avoided ERISA preemption because they challenged the
quality of care they received from their HMO. 9' They were also fortu-
185. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992).
186. See id.
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994); Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan Inc., 953
F. Supp. 419,425 (D. Mass. 1997).
188. Turner, 953 F. Supp. at 425.
189. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1323.
190. See id. at 1338.
191. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,353 (3rd Cir. 1995).
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nate enough to have been heard by a court that was willing to allow the
state court to entertain a vicarious liability theory against the HMO for
the acts of its ostensible agents.' The Corcorans, on the other hand,
challenged the utilization review process of their HMO, and even
though the quality of the health care they received was gravely affected
by the quantity of care. they were allowed under their HMO plan, they
were left without a remedy.'93 Congress should act to eliminate the arbi-
trary distinctions between these cases which caused such disparate re-
sults. An HMO should not be subject to a different set of standards in
each state in which it operates, as may be the case if the Texas law is al-
lowed to stand and other states follow suit. However, neither should
HMOs be allowed to completely insulate medical care from legal reme-
dies simply by blanketing the different aspects of medical care in their
ERISA cloak.
JANE M. MULCAHY
192. See id.
193. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
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